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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
) 
) 
Appel lee, ) 
) 





APPELLEE'S OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY 
INTRODUCTION 
In this second appeal of this case, Y Price Waterhouse 
(defendant below) now seeks from this Court an emergency stay 
pending appeal. There is no justification for such a stay. The 
district court (Judge Gesell) summarily denied a stay, except as 
to attorneys' fees, for the following reasons: 
'Ihis appeal has slight chance of success. All major 
legal issues in this matter have already been resolved 
by prior appeals in this case. No proof was presented 
on the merits followir)J rernarrl. Only discretionary 
equitable relief consistent with established Title VII 
precedent has been ordered. Any stay of the equitable 
relief, regardless of the outcorre on appeal, will 
require further hearir)Js on relief arrl further 
uncertainty. 
Judge Gesell was right. For the reasons he gave, as well as 
those stated hereafter, the stay motion should be denied. There 
is no emergency here, and the time constraint in which defendant 
y ysee Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp. 1109 
(D.D.C. 1985), affirmed as to liability, remanded as to relief, id., 825 F.2d 458 (D.C.Cir. 1987), reversed and remanded, Price waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989). 
now sees itself is one of its own creation. Even if its appeal 
had some merit, nothing irrevocable will happen on July 1, 1990 
if the judgment below is not stayed. Partners come and go 
constantly in Price Waterhouse without judicial intervention. 
But this appeal has no merit. It presents no question that 
is not settled or clearly embraced within prior decisions in this 
case and this Circuit. For that reason plaintiff is 
simultaneously filing a Motion for Summary Affirmance of the 
judgment below. See this Court's General Rules 7(h) (3) and 7(i). 
The law and equities of this case do not support a stay on 
any one of the four factors relevant to such a motion: (1) This 
appeal presents no difficult legal questions, for it merely 
involves fact-bound applications of the law of case and the 
informed exercise of equitable discretion as to relief; defendant 
cannot show that it is likely to prevail on appeal. (2) Nor can 
it show any likelihood of serious, much less irreparable, 
injury. (3) on the other hand, plaintiff would be clearly and 
irreparably injured if a stay were granted. (4) The public 
interest opposes a stay. See Rule 7(h) (1) (A) of this Court; 
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. Federal Power 
Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); also Hilton v. 
Braunskill, 107 s.ct. 2113, 2119 (1987). 
The variant of Virginia Petroleum Jobbers set forth in 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, 
Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. 1977) has no application to this motion 
because the equities do not favor defendant, but rather 
' 
' 
plaintiff; and the appeal presents no legal question that can be 
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described as serious, much less difficult. 
It is also fatal to defendant's motion that it cannot 
' plausibly show that it will be irreparably injured by the denial 
of the motion, for even under Holiday Tours this is the essential 
predicate for a stay on appeal. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
The facts are set forth in the District Court's May 14, 1990 
memorandum containing its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law and in plaintiff's accompanying Motion for Summary 
Affirmance. We refer to them only as necessary in the following 
discussion. 
A. THERE IS NO EMERGENCY JUSTIFICATION 
There is no "emergency" justification for the stay now 
sought. Judge Gesell issued his findings of fact and conclusions 
of law on May 14, 1990, clearly stating the relief he intended to 
order. May 14, 1990 Mem. 19-20 and accompanying order (see Tab 1 
to Motion for Summary Affirmance). He directed the parties to 
confer on the form of order (they did) and set a hearing on May 
25, 1990 for approval of a final order. On May 25, 1990, the 
final order now appealed was entered (Tab 2 to Motion for Summary 
Affirmance). 
However, this appeal was not taken until 27 days after 
that. On June 21, 1990 Price Waterhouse noted its appeal and 
requested a stay pending appeal in the court below. Nowhere in 
its motion does Price Waterhouse explain this long delay in light 
of the "emergency" request now made. For 38 days it knew it 
would be directed to admit Ann Hopkins to partnership on July 1, 
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1990. Yet it began the motion steps which have ended here only 
five days before that date. 
Apart from the merits of the stay motion, the claimed 
emergency is plainly fictitious, a self-created situation which 
defendant asks this Court to alleviate by granting extraordinary 
relief. As we show hereafter, even if defendant had acted with 
convincing dispatch, its stay motion would have been 
unwarranted. However, its claimed entitlement to emergency 
relief is frivolous. Its failure to comply with the seven-day 
requirement of this Court's Rule 7(h) (2) or to provide any real 
justification for that t~ilure is sufficient ground alone to 
justify denial of the motion. 
B. 
1. 
THE FOUR STAY FACTORS APPLIED 
The Appeal Presents No Difficult Question, No_:VAny 
Likelihood of Reversal of the Decision Below 
On the issue of liability the district court applied the law 
of the case to a factual record that has been unchanged since the 
first appeal. The additional evidence introduced after remand 
from the Supreme Court served only to inform the district court's 
discretion in fashioning equitable relief. The aspect of that 
relief which defendant attacks in its stay motion, the order 
admitting Ann Hopkins to partnership in Price Waterhouse, was 
clearly foreshadowed, if not ordained, by this Court's 1987 
decision on relief, and that part of this Court's decision was 
left undisturbed by the Supreme Court. See May 14, 1990 Mem. 12-14. 
y The merits are discussed in greater detail in the 
accompanying Motion for Summary Affirmance. 
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The record clearly supports the district court's finding 
that Price Waterhouse failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have rejected Ms. Hopkins' partnership 
candidacy even in the absence of sex discrimination. See May 14, 
1990 Mem. 5-11. Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, 
F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), that finding is so unassailable that defendant 
did not even cite it as justification for a stay in the court 
below. Nor does it now. 
Instead defendant renews the stay argument made below that 
admission to partnership is not a proper Title VII remedy even 
where such admission was discriminatorily denied. 
There is no likelihood that this argument will succeed on 
the merits. Defendant has never convincingly explained how its 
position can be squared with the Supreme Court's decision, 
including Justice Powell's concurrence, in Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), 11 in light of the make-whole 
remedial powers of Title VII courts. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The district court rightly held that 
Hishon provides "ample authority" for its order. May 14, 1990 
Mem. 16. The propriety of the order now appealed was underscored 
by the Supreme Court's June 18, 1990 refusal to review an order 
directing that a successful Title VII plaintiff be granted 
1J As Justice Powell rightly noted, the Court's opinion in 
Hishon "does not require that the relationship among partners be 
characterized as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VII 
would apply." 467 U.S. at 79. Plaintiff agrees. The order 
below does not arguably imply the contrary, and the issue of 
relations between Price Waterhouse partners is not presented 
here. Rather, the issue is plaintiff's right to become a partner. 
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academic tenure on a university faculty. Brown v. Trustees of 
Boston University, 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 58 
U.S.L.W. 3796 (June 19, 1990). The order in Brown is at least as 
invasive of collegial decisionmaking as the grant of partnership 
status in a large nationwide business firm with nearly 1,000 
partners. 
The district court also rightly relied on this Court's 
recent decision in Lander v. Lujan, 88 F.2d 153 (D.C.Cir. 1989), 
where the Court ordered that the top career manager in a federal 
agency be "bumped" in order to reinstate Lander after he won his 
Title VII claim: 
District Courts must strive to grant "the rrost 
carrplete relief possible" in cases of Title VII 
violations. d Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 
747, 764 (1976). In particular, the courts must make 
the victim "whole" by "'plac[ing him], as near as nay 
be, in the situation he would have occupied if the 
wrong had not been committed."' Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-19 [(1975)) (quoting Wicker 
v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 99 (1867)). 
Id. at 156, quoted at May 14, 1990 Mem. 17. The intrusive effect 
of the judgment below is not nearly as great as the relief 
ordered in Lander. 
Indeed, this Court's 1987 decision in the first appeal of 
this case presaged the relief granted by the court below. 
Repeatedly in that decision the Court indicated its expectation 
that if the district court had found a constructive discharge in 
1985 it would have ordered that Hopkins be made a partner in 
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Price Waterhouse . .ii That may have been dictum at the time, but 
it unmistakably signaled that this Court had no doubt as to the 
legal and equitable power of a Title VII court to order admission 
to partnership. Moreover the Court's ruling that Price 
Waterhouse's failure to make Hopkins a partner in 1983 and to 
renominate her in 1984 "would have been viewed by any reasonable 
senior manager in her position as a career-ending decision" and 
thus a constructive discharge, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 
F.2d at 473, implied the corollary that the appropriate relief 
for a discriminatory denial of partnership is to direct that 
partnership be granted. On these relief issues, this Court was 
unanimous. Id., n.1. 
Thus, Price Waterhouse fails to show any likelihood that it 
will prevail in its demand for an arbitrary, reasonless limita-
tion of Title VII relief that would make the statute ineffective 
to remedy career-ending denials of the logical and common goal of 
professional employees in large partnerships. Nor does it begin 
to explain how the district court abused its discretion in 
granting the relief ordered here. Most important, as we now 
_!./ See 825 F.2d at 464: "Having concluded that Hopkins was a 
victim of sexual discrimination, the trial judge went on to find 
that she was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing the 
firm to make her a partner." 
Id. at 464-465: "Accordingly, the [trial] court denied her 
both backpay from the date of her resignation and a decree 
requiring that she be invited to join Price Waterhouse as a 
partner." 
Id. at 472 "With respect to post(r]esignation damages, the 
District Court found that Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that 
she had been constructively discharged and therefore was 
ineligible both for backpay subsequent to the date of her 
resignation and an order directing that she be made a partner." 
(Underscoring added.) 
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show, defendant fails to explain how the July 1 deadline which it 
has known of for more than 40 days is a "point of no return" 
justifying extraordinary relief on an emergency timetable. 
2 • Defendant's Claim Of Irreparable Injury 
Is Unsupported and Implausible 
It would be hard to imagine a thinner claim of irreparable 
injury than the one made here by appellant. On July 1, 1990 no 
"eggs" will be scrambled. Every year on that very date Price 
Waterhouse admits 40 or more new partners. Every year it also 
loses partners. All of this occurs regularly without trauma or 
serious injury to the ongoing firm and its partners. It is also 
hard to believe that there are not scores of partners at Price 
Waterhouse who are less than warmly regarded by other partners or 
by employees who must work with them. Personal relationships in 
a firm with some 90 offices, more than 900 partners, and 
thousands of employees are matters of individual preference and, 
to a large degree, of adventitious association in the 
workplace. Indeed, Price Waterhouse is so large that its members 
must wear nametags at its annual meeting. 
As a new partner, plaintiff will have no say in the 
management of the firm during the next two years. Her skills and 
professional competence, as the district court noted, are not 
seriously questioned. She has in the past done more than her 
share to enhance Price Waterhouse's business and income. There 
is not the slightest reason to think she will (or could) harm its 
reputation. 
The district court gave car~ful consideration to such 
matters. See May 14, 1990 Mem. 17-19. The suggestion that 
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Hopkins' relations with clients could cause Price Waterhouse 
irreparable injury is already answered in the record. "She had 
no difficulty dealing with clients and her clients appear to have 
been very pleased with her work." Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 
618 F.Supp. at 112. See 109 s.ct. at 1782. 
Defendant's claim of irreparable injury really reflects no 
more than its unwillingness to accept the judgment of the court 
below that the only proven and found reason for its refusal to 
admit Ann Hopkins to partnership was a reason that violated Title 
VII. However, as Judge Gesell held, "[t]he fact that Price 
Waterhouse opposes her admission to partnership cannot 
control." May 14, 1990 Mem. 17. There is hardly a Title VII 
defendant that does not leave the courthouse still convinced of 
its position, no matter what the outcome of its case. 
The failure to make a convincing showing of likely 
irreparable injury is fatal to a stay motion, as this Court held 
in Wisconsin Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 758 F.2d 669. There it denied 
relief on that ground alone in a case where the stakes were 
clearly larger than they are here but the threat of injury was no 
more plausibly demonstrated. 
3. Plaintiff Would Be Irreparably Injured By A Stay 
The one clear victim of irreparable injury would be Ann 
Hopkins if a stay were to be granted. She first joined Price 
Waterhouse in 1978, when she was 34 years old. She is now 46. 
She has already lost seven irreplaceable years of partnership 
practice and progression. The normal retirement age at Price 
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Waterhouse is 60. Institutions pass through time with no 
necessary losses; adult human beings do not. 
A stay would almost certainly entail an additional year or 
more of delay in the time when Hopkins would be admitted to 
partnership. That is an unwarranted and harsh added penalty 
which cannot be justified in this case by any of the other three 
relevant factors -- especially since defendant has not 
demonstrated any likelihood that it will ultimately prevail. 
The fact that Hopkins likes her current job at the World 
Bank cannot obscure the truth that it was not her first choice, 
but rather a career alternative that she perforce sought and 
pursued after her chosen career at Price Waterhouse seemed 
foreclosed. It would be an ironic outcome under Title VII if the 
obligation of a discrimination victim to mitigate her injuries by 
seeking out the best possible alternative employment were then to 
be cited as a bar to the relief she sued to obtain. The 
perpetrator of discrimination can have nothing persuasive to say 
about whether the victim should be content with the consequences 
which she was forced to accept in the interim. 
4 • The Public Interest Favors Denial Of A Stay. 
Defendant Seeks To Equate Its own Private Interest 
With That Of The Public 
In its stay motion to the district court, defendant 
relegated the public interest to a footnote and urged that a stay 
of the judgment in this case "does not implicate the 'public 
interest.'" Y One would then suppose that it believed a denial 
y Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
for Stay, p.5, n.5. 
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of a stay also would not implicate the public interest, else it 
would have made that claim. 
Price Waterhouse now professes to see things differently and 
argues that denial of a stay will indeed harm the public interest 
because of that "delicate policy balance" between "employer 
rights and employee prerogatives." Stay motion, p. 17, citing 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. at 1786. That language is 
wrested from the Supreme Court's discussion of the interests to 
be balanced in determining liability. But once liability has 
been determined and it has been found that employer prerogatives 
have indeed caused a violation of employee rights, the remedy 
cannot be postponed or vitiated by such abstract concerns. 
In truth defendant's newfound public interest argument is 
simply a redressing of its argument that partnerships are 
sacrosanct. The public interest in thus really defendant's own 
interest, for there is no evidence that any other decision in a 
partnership case arising under Title VII is awaiting this Court's 
action on the pending stay motion. 
However, this case has been widely reported and has been 
seen as a vindication of Title VII's ability to reach and remedy 
the subtler forms of discrimination which frequently characterize 
professional employment and which have often placed a "glass 
ceiling" above women and minority professionals. 
It would be profoundly disturbing to other victims of such 
discrimination to see that an employer such as Price Waterhouse 
could postpone relief on the basis of the sort of arguments made 
here, bolstered by reliance on ancient notions about partnerships 
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formed in an era when professional firms were typically small, 
local, and highly personal. 
Title VII cases commonly pit a single individual against an 
institutional employer with far greater resources. To imply that 
the slimmest chance of appellate success -- with no plausible 
claim of serious injury -- suffices to postpone relief for a year 
or more after final judgment cannot help but signal other 
employees that they must be prepared for an unequal war of 
attrition if they sue under Title VII. 
Conversely, that law's purposes are served if there is no 
relaxation in discrimination cases of the stringent tests which 
generally govern stays, particularly in a case where the claim of 
emergency is so obviously unjustified. 
C. APPELLANT HAS NOT JUSTIFIED A STAY 
OF THE BACKPAY AWARD 
Whether defendant is entitled as a matter of right to stay 
payment of the $371,175 backpay award during this appeal by 
posting a supersedeas bond in an amount sufficient to secure that 
award, including interest, depends on whether the award is 
characterized as a part of the injunctive relief awarded by the 
district court or as a separate money judgment. F.R.Civ.P. 62(d) 
incorporated by reference the exception in Rule 62(a) for 
judgments in actions for injunctions. 
The district court evidently took the view that the backpay 
award was itself a part of injunctive relief. Y That, of 




course, is the interpretation of Title VII authoritatively stated 
in Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 ff. 
(1975). Moreover, the district court's detailed consideration of 
the backpay issue bespeaks its equitable approach to this 
matter. May 14, 1990 Mem. 20-31. 
Plaintiff does not deny that the court below had discretion 
under F.R.Civ.P. 62(d) to grant a stay conditioned upon suitable 
security or that this Court has the same authority under F.R.App. 
8. The point is that defendant has made no showing to justify 
such an action, much less to justify it as an emergency matter, 
for the reasons previously stated. 
CONCLUSION 




Dou~ B. Huron 
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER 
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 950 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Attorneys for Appellee 
award as "a money judgment" clearly did not bind the district 
court; nor did plaintiff suggest ,that the district court was 
required to allow defendant to p6st a supersedeas bond and stay 
the award. See appellant's stay motion, p.18, n.8. 
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